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Abstract –Wireless Sensor Networks are new 
emerging technology used in various applications 
for habitat, health and air pollution monitoring, 
vehicle tracking etc. Every sensor node is powered 
with battery that must last for mounts or years 
which constrains the WSN in term of energy used. 
Other critical issue is the secure communication 
between the nodes and the deployment of 
cryptography method is challenging task. Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) is low- power 
consuming cryptographic scheme that combines 
high- level of security and low power usage for key 
generation and its distribution through the 
network.   
Keywords – Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), Elliptic 
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), 
Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman (ECDH).  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The term Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) refers to a 
heterogeneous network that combines autonomous 
tiny nodes named as sensors (data acquisition) with 
computing elements (data processing).  WSN is 
consisted of hungers or thousands of low-cost and 
low-power limited nodes, called sensor nodes, mostly 
with fixed locations used for environment monitoring 
and data acquisition. The sensor nodes have local 
power sources such as onboard battery used for 
communication and data processing. Battery must last 
for long time periods (days, months and even years) 
so it is necessary for low- power operations and 
transmission.  Every sensor network faces several 
challenges in term of limited hardware, scalability, 
secure wireless communication (jamming, 
eavesdropping) and physical layer attacks. 
Several standardization bodies are working on 
deploying standards for wireless sensor networks. 
One example is IEEE 802.15.4 that defines physical 
layer and MAC layer. IEEE 802.15.4 is wireless 
communication protocol for low- cost devices with 
limited resources. The PHY layer operates on three 
frequency bands: 868.0-868.6MHz (Europe, one 
channel), 902-9128MHz (North America, 30 
channels), 2400-2483.5MHz (word-wide, 16 
channels). Data transmission rates are 20kpbs 
(868MHz band), 40kbps (902MHz band) and 
250kbps (2.4GHz band). The Medium Access 
Control (MAC) is responsible for channel access, 
beacon and GTS management, frame validation and 
acknowledgment. To regulate channel access 
802.15.4 uses carrier sense multiple access with 
collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) scheme. IEEE 
802.15.4 has basic built security in MAC layer that 
relies on symmetric cryptography. Thus, security 
became crucial issue particularly for applications 
where WSN is developed in hostile environment. In 
order to establish secure network it is necessary to 
develop and design secure protocols to deal with the 
encryption issues and key management 
Wireless Sensor Networks use Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) due difficulty of solving 
discrete logarithm problem (DLPP). Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography is emerging technology with low 
memory resources usage, low processing power and 
higher security against powerful attacks. These makes 
it suitable for usage in energy constrained wireless 
senor networks.    
In this paper power analysis will be represented with 
offered optimization. The analysis is done using 
software packet EccM-2.0 implemented in TinyOS. 
Sector 2 discuses the basic of Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography. Sector 3 represents the basics of 
ECDH and ECDSA. Sector 4 represents the 
simulation scenarios, obtained results and their 
analysis. Section 5 concludes.    
2. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY 
(ECC) 
ECC is new public key cryptographic scheme 
independently developed by Kobilz [1] and Miller [2] 
in 1985. An elliptic curve is two- dimensional curve 
used in many mathematical and cryptographic 
algorithms (e.g. public key cryptosystem, pseudo- 
random number generator etc).   The elliptic curve is 
a cubic equation over binary (or prime) field F given 
with Weiestrass Equation (1).  
64
2
2
3
31
2 axaxaxyaxyay +++=++         (1) 
Where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6, F∈  and discriminate of the 
curve Δ≠0.  
 
Fig. 1 – Elliptic Curve y2+xy=x3+2x2+1over binary fields 
Over binary fields the Weiestrass equation is 
transformed into simpler form (2) 
:E 2 3 2y xy x ax b+ = + +                   (2) 
Where a, b mF2∈ and 0274
23 ≠+=∆ ba . Fig. 1 
shows the most commonly used elliptic curve 
y2+xy=x3+2x2+1 over binary fields. The set of points x 
and y together with a special so-called point to 
infinity O form a commutative group. The arithmetic 
operation such as adding, subtraction, multiplication, 
inversion and squaring are defined in [3].  
The security of ECC lies in the difficulty to solve the 
discrete logarithm problem over finite fields. In order 
to solve this problem integer k must be found, so that 
for a given point P from the elliptic curve, Q=kP. 
This problem is practically insoluble for sufficiently 
large integer value of k. The main operation with the 
points of elliptic curve is finding geometric sum P(x3, 
y3) of two points Q(x1, y1) and R(x2, y2) over binary 
field. This operation is not simple and is performed 
using Equations (3) and (4) over binary fields. 
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Note that these operations are per module p. But these 
operations cannot be used for point addition by itself 
because the denominators in the Equation (3) and (4) 
are zero and division by zero is obtained. Point 
addition by itself is a special case of two point’s 
addition known as duplication of the point over 
binary fields. It is performed using the equation (5) 
and (6).  
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Multiplication kP is obtained by performing addition 
operation k times using point addition and point 
doubling. Let k be a scalar and equal to 23 then the 
multiplication kP=23P=2(2(2(2P) +P) +P). 
As mention before, the weight of ECDLP is the 
problem of determining integer k. ECC relies on the 
difficulty of solving ECDLP because if the 
eavesdropper is able to solve it, then eavesdropper 
will be able to break down the system. But, based on 
arithmetic operation of elliptic curve it is difficult to 
calculate k because the problem is associated with 
factorizations of large integers. The main advantage 
of ECDLP over traditional public key cryptographic 
schemes is that obtains same level of security with 
smaller key size.     
3. EC DIFFIE- HELLMAN (ECHD) AND EC 
DIGITAL SIGNATURE (ECDSA)  
Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman (ECDH) is a protocol 
for key agreement that allows sensor nodes to 
establish a shared key that can be used for private key 
algorithms. The shared key is calculated using public 
data and private data of the sensor node. Any third 
party that doesn’t have access to private data of each 
node will not be able to calculate the shared key. 
First step in generating shared key, sensor nodes A 
and B must agree for EC domain parameters that 
define the elliptic curve. Both nodes have a key pair 
consisting of a private key d, which is randomly 
selected integer less than the order of the curve n, and 
public key Q=dG, where G is generator point. Let 
(dA, QA) and (dB, QB) are the pair private key- public 
key of sensor nodes A and B appropriately. The 
sensor node A computes K=(xK,yK)=dA*QB, while 
sensor node B computes L=(xL,yL)=dB*QA. Since 
dAQB=dAdBG=dBdAG=dBQA. Therefore K=L and 
hence the shared key is xK since xK=xL. 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) [4], is a 
form of a digital signature algorithm applied on 
elliptic curves to authenticate the senor nodes or 
message sent by the sensor node. The digital 
signature is a value calculated from the value of the 
secret (private) key and is modern replacement of 
handwritten signature. For sending a signed message 
sensor nodes A and B must agree upon EC domain 
parameters. In order node B to authenticate a message 
sent by node A, node A must signs the message using 
its private key. The message and the signature are 
simultaneously sent to node B, and since node B 
knows node’s A public key easily can verify the 
message. ECDSA is an asymmetric signature scheme 
that provides resistance to various attacks because the 
signature and the message are independent from each 
other.  
4. SIMULATION SCENARIOS, RESULTS AND 
ANALYSE 
The simulations are performed on the free open 
source operating system TinyOS that has component- 
based and event-based architecture. TinyOS [5] is not 
a general purpose OS but is a flexible framework 
designed for wireless embedded sensor networks 
which require minimum hardware (RAM and ROM 
memory). One of the most important aspects of 
TinyOS is its modular design. Running TinyOS 
program is simply a combination of different modules 
connected together to comprise the end program. 
Every application is set of tasks and processes written 
in NestedC (nesC) programming language. NesC is 
an extension of C structured programming language 
optimized for the memory– restricted wireless sensor 
networks. 
TOSSIM (TinyOS SIMulator) is TinyOS discrete 
event simulator which allows debugging, testing and 
analyze of the implemented EccM-2.0 code [6]. The 
main advantage of this simulator is ability to simulate 
simultaneously thousands of sensor nodes and 
compiles directly from TinyOS code. Thus, 
developers can test not only their algorithms but also 
their implementations. TOSSIM simulates the 
TinyOS network stack at the bit level, allowing 
experimentation with low-level protocols in addition 
to top-level application systems. As TOSSIM runs on 
a PC, users can examine TinyOS code using 
debuggers and other development tools. TOSSIM 
supports radio and energy (power) model. The 
simulations presented below are done using the 
energy model. The energy model does not model the 
consumption of energy, but easily request 
information from the components if their state is 
changed (e.g. whether the sensor node is on or off). 
EccM-2.0 represents large integers using a byte array 
known as “big integer” or bigints. The right most 
element of the array represents the 8 least significant 
bits of the big integer. The left- most elements 
represents the 8 most significant bits. EccM-2.0 
performs modular arithmetic on bigints. It takes two 
byte arrays that represents bigints and bit length of 
the bigint, uses the second bigint argument as the 
modulus and then places the result in the first bigint 
argument. The keys are 163-bits and are randomly 
selected number between 0 and n (n is order of the 
elliptic curve) with equal probability from which 80 
bits are for security.   
The simulations presented below are performed 
according the NIST recommendation for Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC). EccM2.0 implements 
ECC over binary finite fields with the irreducible 
polynomial 1)( 367163 ++++= xxxxxf .The curve’s 
order (the number of points) is n=0x400000000000 
0000000020108a2e0cc0d99f8a5ef and the base point 
is G(x,y) where x =0x2fe13c0537bbc11acaa07 
d793de4e6d5e5c94eee8 and y = 0x289070fb05 
d38ff58321f2e800536d538ccdaa3d9. After compiling 
EccM-2.0 the consumed RAM and ROM are 
represented in Table 1.  
Table 1Consumed RAM and ROM 
Compiled EccM2.0  
40382 bytes RAM 
1067 bytes ROM 
 
In this paper are presented simulations on two 
different types of network topologies, grid and 
random with or without power management. Fig 2 
shows random and grid topology of 4 nodes 
represented in TinyViz. . The number of nodes must 
be an integer form square root thus, each set of 
simulations contain from 4 up to 100 nodes. During 
the simulation three parameters were examine: CPU 
Total, Radio Total and Total Energy. The parameter 
CPU Total is consumed energy for generating the pair 
of private and public key and processing of the 
received messages, while the parameter Radio Total 
is the consumed energy for transmission of the public 
key and consumed energy due communication with 
other sensor nodes. The parameter Total Energy gives 
the overall energy consumption and is sum of 
parameters CPU Total and Radio Total.       
 
Fig. 2 – a) Random topology  b) grid topology 
The first simulation scenario was without power 
management on grid and random topology. Each 
topology was tested in simulation with duration of 10 
and 20 seconds. The private key is 163- bits randomly 
generated. Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 represent the 
average values for parameters CPU Total, Radio 
Total and Total Energy all measured in mJ. 
 
Fig. 3 – CPU total energy consumption  
 
Fig. 4 – Radio Total energy consumption 
 
Fig. 5 – Total Energy consumption  
In order to prevent from multiple-key single- message 
attack the code is changed and the private key is 
fixed. The next set of simulations is performed under 
the same conditions as the previous set. The result 
from testing parameters CPU Total, Radio Total and 
Total Energy are represented on Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and 
Fig. 8, appropriately.  
 
Fig. 6 – CPU Total energy consumption  
 
Fig. 7 – Radio Total energy consumption  
 
Fig. 8 – Total energy consumption  
These two simulation scenarios show that energy 
consumption is increased as the number of sensor 
nodes grows. Also energy consumption does not 
depend from the network topology. The fix key 
prevents only from multiple-key single- message 
attack and does not influent on energy consumption.   
By default, TOSSIM uses an old version of the mica 
radio stack (40Kbit RFM), including the MAC, 
encoding, synchronous acknowledgements and 
timing but does not support power management and 
tuning transmission power. It does not simulate the 
mica2 ChipCon CC1000 stack by default. 
PowerTOSSIM includes a port of the mica2 radio 
stack, so it is now possible to run programs that take 
advantage of the CC1000's power management 
features. The next simulation scenarios are with 
duration of 10 and 20 seconds and tasted on grid and 
random topology for random and fixed keys. Fig. 9, 
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 represent the average values for 
parameters CPU Total, Radio Total and Total Energy 
measured in mJ with included power management 
using random key.  Fig. 12, Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 
represent the average values for parameters CPU 
Total, Radio Total and Total Energy, appropriately, 
when fixed key is used for preventing multiple- key 
single- message attack. The results obtained by this 
simulations match with the previous results. 
Increasing the number of sensor nodes led to more 
power consumption.  
 
Fig. 9 – CPU Total energy consumption 
 
Fig. 10 – Radio Total energy consumption 
 
Fig. 11 – Radio Total energy consumption 
 
Fig. 12 – Radio Total energy consumption 
 
Fig. 13 – Radio Total energy consumption 
 
Fig. 14 – Radio Total energy consumption 
The implementation of power management function 
led to slightly decreasing of the energy which is 
critical in networks with constrained resources. Also 
the energy consumption increases when the duration 
of the simulations is extended. This is because every 
sensor node generates pair of random and private 
keys for every new communication with other sensor 
node although these sensor.     
5. CONCLUSION 
Wireless sensor networks face limitations in term of 
energy consumption and supply. Therefore, 
implemented Elliptic Curve Cryptography must 
trade-off low-energy usage and high- level of 
security. In order to perform analyze simulation with 
two different network topologies and different 
number of sensor nodes were performed. The 
simulations were performed using PowerTOSSIM 
which is scalable simulation environment for WSN 
that provides accurate, per node estimation of the 
power consumption. This allows researching, testing 
and analyzing wireless sensor networks in the process 
of planning the network.  
Performed simulations and calculations show that 
fixing the key does not influence the energy 
consumption. Fixed key only prevents from multiple- 
key single- message attack. Also, increasing the 
number of sensor nodes led to constant increase of 
energy consumption. For further decreasing of the 
energy consumption power management was 
implemented which slightly decreased the consumed 
energy. 
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